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FALLACIES OF THE RECALL OF JUDICIAL
DECISIONS
By T. B. KELLEY.
"If an act of the legislature is declared by the state courts to violate
a provision in the state constitution, after an interval for consideration, the
people of the state shall have an opportunity to vote on the question
whether they desire to have the act become the law in spite of the fact
that the opinion of the court is that the statute is contrary to the constitution."

The above proposition hatched in the fertile and productive brain of
our Ex-President Roosevelt and commonly known as "The Recall of
Judicial Decisions," has caused much disturbance, and just now, among
subjects of popular discussion holds a prominent place.
By many it is regarded as an entirely new thing, a recent innovation,
a veritable res nova, with all the interest that attaches to a maxvelous
political elixir, just discovered, and of which, as is usual, in regard to its
virtues and faults it is not understood even by political savants and
patent medicine venders. But upon a closer examination it will be
found that it is only in comparison with the recent past that this system
can claim the charm of novelty. "It hath already' been of old time
which was before us," and if there be new things under the sun, the
so called Recall of Judicial Decisions is not one of them. Direct
legislation is the most convenient and natural expression of the will of
a comparatively small and democratic, self-governing, independent state.
It was not wanting in ancient and medieval times. The pure democracies
of Greece and her lesser successors down to the present time bear testimony of this fact. It was so in the primitive German tribes in the time
of Tacitus. High among the Alps, a sturdy race, realizes even until this
day a pure democracy in the smaller divisions of the Swiss government;
but changes have come in the national government, written constitutions
have taken the place of customs and precedents, and a representative form
Drevails. as it necessarily must in any form of government which has
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attained, or ever will attain, any degree of prominence among the nations
of the world.
Indiscussing the advisability of any proposition it is first essential
to get a clear idea of exactly what that proposition means. From the
name applied-Recall of Judicial Decisions,--many have supposed that
it meant, that when, in a tribunal, a certain issue is decided, as we may
surmise, against the defendant, the people might vote on whether the
decision should remain in favor of the defendant or be reversed. This
is not the true meaning, but it is as set forth in the first few lines of
this paper, i. e: that the judgment is not to be recalled, but that the
validity of the law governing, is to be decided by the people assembled in
the booths.
Further limitations are put upon the proposition by its author in
such words that it seems he must have meant that no one should understand them. These limitations are: That he stands for recall, by a vote
of the people, of only such judicial decisions as (1) are rendered by
state supreme courts in declaring state statutes unconstitutional, (2)
where the litigation is not one between man and man, but only where it
concerns some great economic or social question involving the general
welfare of the whole people of a large vlass, (3) where there is not
involved the question of the validity of a statute as repugnant to the
Federal constitution. As to the classes negatived he means to suspend
the action of the recall, and let it be applied in all others. The first
limitation is itself an emphasis and indication of the telestic failure
which such a system must meet. It brings out clearly the inconsistency
and repugnancy of direct judicial adjudication by the people of a state.
The people of any state, which can be only a small part of our Federal
jurisdiction, may be so easily wrought up over some certain topic for a
time that in contradiction to all good judgment, law, or society they will
so vote as to impose on themselves a law which, in a cooler moment,
they would not think of. approving if enacted by a legislature and which
no level headed Legislator would ever vote for.
The second limitation cannot stand as it reads and leave any application for the Recall; for every lawyer and judge knows, and every layman
should know, that the great economic questions do not arise (except in
very rare cases), as a special case to be decided for the purpose of settling
a momentous question, but spring up in a case between man and man
in which at first the direct and concrete object of the litigation is devoid
of public interest. This classification is not meant as it is stated or
else means nothing at all.
The third qualification-That any statute in conflict with the Federal
constitution shall not be voted upon, practically eliminates all applica-
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tion for the recall. The provisions of the Federal Constitution comprise
in almost the identical words the principal provisions embodied in the
state constitutions. Almost without exception when a statute is in conflict with a state constitution it is also in conflict with the Federal Constitition, and thus the question adjudicated would really be the
repugnance of a state statute to the Federal Constitution. Thus the
people of a state could not decide the constitutionality of a statute until
it had been adjudicated by the Federal Courts; neither could the decision
by the people be binding even on the state in another like case, for the
state courts are sworn to decide cases in accordance with the requirements
of the Federal Constitution, and the votes of the people could not change
a principle of fundamental law established by a judicial judgment.
This leads us to a more important and decisive view of the question,
to-wit: That any law providing for a Recall of Judicial Decisions is
itself unconstitutional, it being repugnant to the Federal Constitution.
(Art. 4. See. 4). The constitution: there provides that: "The United
States shall guarantee to every state in the union a republican form of
government! ' It is obvious that the Recall of Judicial Decisions could
not apply in any state without a direct provision in the constitution of
the state to that effect. So far as the state is concerned it must first be
adopted as a part of the supreme law, as one of the fundamental principles of its form of government. The framers of the Federal Constitution recognized the distinction between the republican and democratic
form of government and carefully avoided the latter; the form of state
government perpetuated by the Federal Constitution was the republican
form, with the three departments of government, in force in all the
states at the time of the adoption of the constitution.
Direct legislation by the popular vote of the people is invalid because
government by the people directly is inconsistent with our form of government. And now to prove the latter statement let us ascertain the exact
meaning of the phrase--- Republican Form of Government," especially
as in contra-distinction to a democratic form. "Webster" defines a
republic, or a state having a republican form of government as: "
commonwealth, a state in which the exercise of the sovereign power is
lodged in representatives elected by the people. In modern usage, it
differs from a democracy or a democratic state, in which the people exercise the power of sovereignty directly." And then for an example of the
proper use of the word he gives a quotation from Joseph Sfory es
follows: "The founders of the constitution laid the cornerstone of our
national republic." A democracy is defined as "A government by the
people, a form of government in which the supreme power is lodged in
the hands of the -neonle dirpeflv. nr a Rf onr hn~v nnlI _fia pa1isalavp
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judicial and executive power of which is in the hands of the people, either
directly or through representatives.' Applying these definitions to the
principles advocated by the Recall of Judicial Decisions can any fair
minded man of common sense and judgment say that under a system
where the final decision as to what the governing rules of our state shall
be is left to the people and to them alone, is a republic? Everyone must
emphatically answer: No! it is not a republican form of government but
is a democracy and as near a pure democracy as is possible to have in a
great nation. Under the proposed method all three of the departments
of the government are jumbled up together, all separation of powers
disregarded, and so conglomerated are handed to the public, the mob,
majority, or whatever you may call it, for them to mangle and tear to
pieces as they may see fit. Is this the sort of republican form of government which is guaranteed to each of the states by the Federal Constitution? No man who has ever passed through the primary grades in the
study of Civics would say "yes.'
That this state of affairs was forseen and deliberately provided
against is evidenced by a quotation from Madison in the Federalist in a
discussion concerning what sort of government we should adopt,-"But who can say what experiments may be produced by the
caprice of particular states, by the ambition of enterprising leaders,
or by the intrigue and influence of foreign powers ?
"As long, therefore, as the existing republican forms are continued by the states they are guaranteed by the Federal Constitution.
"The only restriction imposed on them is this: that they sbal!
not exchange republican for anti-republican constitutions; a restriction which, it is presumed, will hardly be considered as a grievance?'
And Webster in his speech of the Rhode Island government, said:
"The people cannot act daily as people. They must establish
a government and invest it with as much of the sovereign power
as the case requires. * * * * The exercise of legislative power and
the other powers of government immediately by the people themselves is impracticable. They must be exercised by representatives
of the people, and what distinguishes the American government as
much as anything else from any government of ancient or modern
times, is the marvelous felicity of its representative system. * * * *
The power is with the people, but they cannot exercise it in masses
or per capita. They can only exercise it by means of their representatives. * * * * *We are not to take the will of the people
from public meeting, or from public assemblies, by which the
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timid are terrified and the prudent are alarmed, and by which
society is disturbed. These are not American modes of securing the
will of the people, and never were."
And the Federal Supreme Court, speaking throug Chief Justice
Fuller, after quoting from Webster's article in the Rhode Island case,
said in the case of In re Duncan, (139 U. S. 449, 461) :
"By the constitution, a republican form of government is
guaranteed to every state in the union, and the distinguishing
feature of that form is the right of the people to choose their own
officers for governmental administration, and pass their own laws
in virtue of the legislative power reposed in representative bodies,
whose legitimate acts may be said to be those of the people themselves; but, while the people are thus the source of political power
their governments, national and state, have been limited by written
constitutions, and they have themselves thereby set bounds to their
own power, as against the mere impulses of the majorities."
These are some of the considerations by which is demonstrated the
fallacy of pure democracy, or the fallacy of direct adjudication of
constitutional questions by popular vote.
It has been stated that the Recall of Judicial Decisions is not really
what its name signifies it to be. This is discussed fully in a speech made
by William B. Hornblower to the graduating class of the Yale Law
School, June 17, 1912, (and may be found in Senate Document 1052),
which is a speech very radically against the Recall of Judges and the
Recall of Decisions; also in a paper by William Draper Lewis, Dean of
the Law School, University of Pennsylvania (Annals of American Acad.
XLIII. 311), who is very much in favor of the Recall of Decisions.
Both of these learned gentlemen deny that the so-called Recall of
Decisions is really what it seems at first reading, but state that it really
means: "when a state statute is declared unconstitutional, the people
of the state shall have the right by a majority vote to set aside the
decision of the court declaring the statute void and to restore the authority
of the statute." As thus construed the proposition is still considered as
a recall of the decision as to the general principle of law involved, although not as to the immediate parties to the suit. But let us see if
it is really in truth a recalling or setting aside of the decision in any
manner. In the first place no court can set aside an act passed by the
lfovslatare. it can declare it unconstitutional and refuse in Afnrpp ,iW'kv
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ignoring the law altogether, but nevertheless the law is still in force and
a suit may be brought based upon it by another party subsequent to the
decision.* But aside from the fact that a court cannot set aside the
statute of a state, let us see if the proposed system would ever have the
effect of recalling or declaring invalid a decision.
To understand this proposition with proper clearness we must trace
briefly the history of the establishment of the seat of our legislative or
law-making power in our state governments. In the beginning before
we had any organized government or before we had any state constitutions, the whole of the law-making power resided in the people; but any
people when formed into a division of government such as is called by
us a state, and having adopted a constitution and a representative form
of government, as required by the Federal Constitution, have delegated
to their legislatures the power and duty to make the laws by which those
same people shall be governed.
Let a circle represent the law-making power of the people as it was
previous to the adoption of any constitution; then when the state is
formed there is made another circle of equal size representing the lawmaking power of the state legislature, but how about the restrictions
against state legislation on certain subjects, said restrictions being those
contained in the state constitution? These we will represent by cutting
off of the second circle, representing the law-making power of the legislature, a part of the circle, this fraction then will be those powers which
are denied to the state legislature by the restriction clauie in the state
constitution. Now if all the power of making laws originally resided in
the people, then this fraction cut off from the legislative power must
reside in the people, that is, it is a reserve power in the people of the
state, concerning which they may make laws by changing the constitution
so as not to deny these powers to the legislature. But suppose that the
legislature in carrying out the powers and duties imposed upon it by the
people -in the adoption of the constitution, should pass a law which, when
some one questions the constitutionality of it, should be declared- by the
courts to be in conflict with the constitution, and that the power which
the legislature exercised was not one of its sovereign powers but belonged
to the excepted portion, the reserved power of the people. Then if the
people had so amended their constitution as to give them the right to
vote on the validity of this law in spite of the opinion of the court
decreeing it to be unconstitutional, and they do vote in the affirmative
*Allison vs Corker, 67 N. J. law. 52 AtI 362, (1902). Annotated in 60 L. RI. A. 564-566.

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL.
for the recall of the courts decision, what is the result? When they vote
the law to be good, do they thereby decide that it is constitutional? No,
they merely say that it shall be a good and valid law even though it be
repugnant to the constitution. Then this is an affirmation that the
decision of the court was correct when it,in its adjudication reached the
conclusion that the statute was in conflict with the state constitution.
They have affirmed that the power to legislate upon the contested question did not reside in the legislature, but that it was exactly as the court
had decided it, i. e., it is one of the reserved cases in which the people
can act. In fact the very act of the people voting on the question, or as
it well may be termed their legislating, has affirmed the proposition
that the legislature had no power to pass such a law; for concerning
those questions upon which the legislature may legislate, the people have
delegated all control they may have ever had to the legislature, and it is
that body alone which may act upon them. Then if the people vote for
the adoption of the law, I repeat it,THEY HAVE AFFIRMED THE
DECISION OF THE COURT AND HAVE NOT, AS IS CLAIMED,
RECALLED IT.
And what is the result of this affirmation? It is a direct attack
upon the constitution of the state, a flat denial by the people that they
are governed by any superior law, for a state constitution is in the form
of restrictions on the various departments, the Legislative as well as
the Executive and Judicial, and when the people declare that one legislative act, repugnant to the constitution, shall be good law notwithstanding
such repugnancy, they are plainly creating an aperture through which
every article of the constitution may be declared inoperative. How
many people are there when they argue in favor of upholding the recall,
who really know what they are talking about? How many realize that
they are destroying all the safeguards of their constitution, they are
adopting a system by which the minority may be run over and trampled
down by the rule of the majority? They will have opened the doors to a
system of legislation which is censured and condemned by every peac
loving statesman, they have gone back to Medieval times, when there was
no organized government, and our ancestors were groping blindly foi
some power with which to combat their demagogue-like rulers.
Aristotle, nearly four centuries before the Christian era said:
"One species of democracy is where the public offices are opei
to every citizen and the law is supreme. Another species of dem.
ocracy is where the public offices are open to every citizen, but when
the people and not the law is supreme. The latter state of thing
occurs when the government is administered by prephismata (b,
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popular vote) and not according to laws, and it is produced by +ha.
influence of ite damagogues. * * * * But where the laws are not
supreme, demagogues arise, for the people become as it were a compound monarch, each individual being invested with power as a
member of the sovereign body and a people of this sort, as if they
were a monarch, seek to exercise a monarchial power in order that
they may not be governed by the laws, and they assume the character
of a despot, wherefore flatterers are in honor by them. A democracy
of this sort is analogous to a tyranny (or despotism among monarchies). Thus the character of the government is the same in
both and they both tyrannize over the superior classes, and
prephismata are in the democracy what special ordinances are in
the despotism. * * * * * Accordingly, is seems to have been justly
said that a democracy of this sort is not entitled*to the name of a
constitution, for where the laws are not supreme, there -is no constitution. In order that there should be a'constitution, it is necessary
that the government should be administered according to the laws,
and that the magistrates and constituted authorities should decide
in the individual cases respecting the application of them."
Burke, in his reflections on the French Revolution said:
"Untii now we have seen no example of considerable democracies. The ancients were better acquainted with them. Not being
wholly unread in the authors who have seen the most of these constitutions and who best understood them, I cannot help concurring
with their opinion that the absolute democracy, no more than the
absolute monarchy, is to be reckoned among the legitimate forms
of government."
And these reflections were made on nations which are older than
ours, where there was more domestic tranquility, and where there was
a greater respect shown for customs and precedents.
Now let us see how this system would work on modern law-making
in regard to what is known as special legislation. There is no doubt
but that it will open the door wide to any measure of discrimination
which the majority may take into their hands to inflict upon the heads
of the helpless minority. It will put upon the public an army of petitionpushers going along the street and button-holeing every citizen, agitating
the weak to stand up for their supposed rights, and under the persuation
of the empty-dry-goods-box-politicians, the public will be detached from
their work and be induced into an attempt to correct their imaginary sufferings.
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A man may be going along the street with head high, and feeling
as though all the world were his, when he comes to the corner and notices
a large crowd standing around a wagon or platform. On the platform
he perceives a man waiving his arms and making, what seems from a
distance, a great speech; his imagination is at once aroused and he draws
nearer to see what is the cause of this commotion. He perceives upon
drawing nearer that there is another man on the platform, but this other
is a wooden man. The live man is still speaking, he is representing the
average human being as an object of piteous decrepitude or as a hopeless
subject of degenerating tissues and death dealing germs. Then he begins
to listen more attentively, this is getting interesting and concerns him.
The quack next inveighs against all the medical learning of the day and
against the expert knowledge and experience of those acknowledged as
authority in hygiene, medicine and surgery. All learning and experience
as shown from history are as nothing. The wisdom of the fathers was
merely tradition founded in error. What the great scientific men have
wrought and handed down as a result of their many years of study and
experience were mockeries to the truth, all which the man on the platform
proceeds to prove by saying that the medicine of today does not prevent
death, for did not a man die just yesterday within a block of a large
drug store and a Doctor's office? And only last month five hundred
lives were lost when a great ship sank? Then he seems to swell up with
some potent influence, and looking straight at the passer-by declares that:
"every man is threatened with immediate incapacity and death." Then
having thus demonstrated his major premise and at the same time all the
other assumed elements of his syllogism, he reaches down into an old
trunk by his side and takes out a little round yellow box, labeled in large
red letters: "A MAGIC CURE ALL." -Up to this time the passer-by
had been feeling pretty well, but at the sight of that little pill box and
the words that followed its production, ("Now gentlemen you perceive
here in my hand one of the most wonderful remedies that has ever been
concocted, one of these little pills, dissolved in a glass of pure water
and swallowed will immediately stop any pain you may have, no matter
where it is or what its cause"); he begins to feel as though there were
something inside of him that is not exactly as it should be, he feels a
little sick at the stomach and there is a slight pain at the heat-then
those words: "immediate incapacity and death is at your door," sound
in his ear and he takes a second look at the box and is almost persuaded.
He turns to leave -in disgust when there is a rush toward the platform,
everyone is buying a yellow box, all are welcoming the chance to save
their lives. Seized with the spirit of the mob he rushes up and deposits
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receives his life-saver. When he gets home and meets his wife at the
door, and presents the little box instead of the soap, she, who has not
heard the wonderful lecture or been under the influence of the mob,
ridicules him and his fear of death, and immediately calls him a fool
and a spendthrift. And he realizes that she is right.
How many people are there who would not be so influenced by the
agitation of some question brought up under the recall? How many
would have the stability and wisdom to make a cool clear decision of
what is right or what is*wrong? And again how many would be drawn
to the platform, a political one, and join the mob, and be spendthrifts
of their opportunities? It is the same principle from start to finish, fine
phrases to catch the ear of the public ear and get it into an unnatural
state of mind, and then "pop" at them a "cure all" remedy, for political
and governmental ills; and what will we do? Why ? if we have not a
wife to stay at home and not hear the political arrogators, we are very
likely to walk right up and buy another little yellow box.
Appeals to popular justice, inducing unrest and a general state of
instability throughout the nation, should be met with distrust. Clamors
for the "rights" of the people should be checked with a firm hand and
with an altruistic outlook for the preservation of our national and state
government. There should be kept in mind the warning of Hamilton
when he said:
"A dangerous ambition more often lurks behind the specious
mask of zeal for the rights of the people than under the forbidding
appearance of zeal for the firmness and efficiency of government.
History will teach us that the former has found a much more certain
road to the introduction to despotism than the latter, and that of
those men who have overturned the liberties of republics the greatest
number have begun their career by paying an obsequious court to
the people; commencing demagogues and ending tyrants."
It is too often assumed, because there are flaws and instances of
failures in our ad-ministrative government, that all our system is wrong,
that the constitution and fundamental laws by which we are governed
and held in check, are entirely unfit. Such an assumption disregards the
ever present and irremediable imperfection of human existence. No
people can create or ever hope to create a system of rules that will make
them perfectly free. It is an underlying axiom of civilization that we
must necessarily be subject to a degree of oppression, -injustice and inequality. The crudest form of social organization involves a certain
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amount of sacrifice, the individual must give way, and suffer the consequences, for the benefit of the public.
Let it be said that our constitution is imperfect and stands in the
way of proper legislation, yes, even let it be said that our supreme courts
do not rightfully use the powers with which they have been intrusted;
but for the first objection we have an adequate remedy in our present
method of amendment, and for the latter, if it ever be true, we can never
reach a solution by letting the people say whether or not a body of men
of the highest legal training have erred in their judgment.
Finally let it be said: These suggestions do not profess to cover the
subject of Recall of Decisions, which is a great subject worthy of careful
and weighty treatment, but is simply designed to direct attention to the
fallacies of the proposition, and possibly arouse someone, capable of doing
justice to the treatment of it, to a degree where some of the points
herein stated will be worked out more fully, either in an attack upon
them or in their behalf.
Indeed there has often been in the mind of the writer, when trying
to elucidate some of the points, the expression of Job (Job, 31-35):
"Oh! that mine adversary would write a book."

